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What has the impact of the crisis in Crimea been on Vladimir Putin’s domestic political situation? Luke
March writes that there has always been a clear distinction between ‘systemic’ opposition parties,
who are tolerated by the Kremlin, and ‘non-systemic’ opposition movements, which have little
access to the media or state funding. He argues that the net effect of the situation in Crimea has
been to marginalise these non-systemic groups and bolster public support for Vladimir Putin’s
regime, although it remains to be seen how lasting this effect will be.
The massive global hit film The Hunger Games depicts a dystopian future, wherein a once-
rebellious population is cowed by televised fights to the death that reinforce their obeisance to the
avuncular but sinister President Snow. The Games force both viewers and players to remember and celebrate the
iron grip of the Capitol; every victory reinforces the abased atomisation of the opposition before a cynically
sympathetic regime. Is drawing a parallel with Russia a step too far?
Ukraine and the Russian opposition: the Anger Games
Although Russian opposition parties’ combat is seldom life-threatening, it is also rich in invective fulmination and
(occasionally) spectacle, and their activity is heavily and ingeniously manipulated in ways that reinforce the
Kremlin’s authority. The ‘systemic opposition’ (three parties in the State Duma and several kept in reserve outside
parliament) engages in ‘licensed’ criticism of government economic policy, but rarely criticises the executive directly:
rather such parties act as sycophantic supplicants for Presidential favour, spar with each other and direct real or
manufactured anger against the West or the non-systemic opposition equally. The latter are personae non grata,
denied the media access, state funding and privileges of the Duma cartel, and facing an imaginative range of
‘administrative resources’ (dirty tricks) if they are not too busy tearing each other apart (which they regularly do).
If for a while following the 2011-12 elections it looked
like the street opposition was finally breaking out of its
ghetto, it is clear that Russia’s annexation of Crimea
has imposed a decisive marginalisation that will be a
long time in undoing. It is likely that quelling potential
domestic criticism and shoring up Putin’s softening
domestic support was one of the Kremlin’s principal
motivations. After all, a narrative of corrupt authoritarian
leaders being overthrown by street protest in a fraternal
state has obvious implications; far better that the (real)
presence of the radical right on the Maidan be inflated
into a ‘US-backed unconstitutional fascist coup’ which
can thereby be utterly de-linked from any parallels back
home.
Domestically, the Kremlin propaganda machine has
tweaked some veteran Sovietesque tropes to transform
an obviously popular political move into an orgy of
jingoism. While the population rallies round the flag and
Putin’s rating hits stratospheric heights, politicians wear St. George ribbons to demonstrate patriotism and
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dissenters are increasingly framed as ‘national traitors’. Just as with the 2004 atrocity in Beslan, the Kremlin has
used a crisis to accelerate previously mooted grand plans, in this case, ‘cleaning house’ with opposition media.
The Duma opposition as willing cheerleaders
The systemic opposition has played a key role in this evolving dramaturgy. It has long been the case that the Duma
parties do not dissent from the Kremlin foreign policy consensus except in a more hard-line direction, and so it has
proved. Perhaps because its loyalist credentials were suspect in 2011-12 when it threatened to defect to the street
opposition, the would-be social democratic Just Russia party has been the initiator of several of the main initiatives
(including revising legislation to facilitate incorporating new subjects into Russia). Party leader Sergei Mironov
managed to get slapped with US/EU sanctions as a result.
The national-populist Liberal Democratic Party (whose proclamations often act as diversions from substantive
issues) has made headlines by proposing the elimination of the vowel ы from the Russian language (because of its
‘nasty Asiatic’ character) and arguing that Ukraine should cede territory to Poland. For its part, the Communist Party
completely agreed with Putin’s position, adding that the ‘Little Russians’ (i.e. Ukrainians) had a 1,000-year history of
friendship and peace alongside their ‘Great Russian’ brethren, and castigating ‘so-called Western democrats’ for
forgetting that only with the USSR had they defeated fascism.
The 20 March Duma vote for incorporating Crimea within Russia was carried by a 445-1 majority (of 450), with the
sole dissenter being former Just Russia member Ilya Ponomarev, who justified his position on the basis that the
decision would provoke war with Ukraine. A fuller rebuttal of the Kremlin’s position was offered by Yabloko, a non-
parliamentary ‘systemic opposition’ party. The vitriolic reaction to these dissident interventions on the Russian
blogosphere showed that the ‘criticism=traitor=fascist’ discourse ran deep.
Dividing the street opposition
The non-systemic opposition have been completely blindsided by the crisis, which has opened old divisions and
incised many new ones. Their poster-boy Alexei Navalny found himself under house arrest without internet access
from 28 February (it is still unclear how coincidental this is), and his Livejournal account was blocked as soon as he
opposed the intervention. Nevertheless, he still managed to write an op-ed in the New York Times calling for
targeted sanctions on financiers close to the Kremlin’s inner circle. That a number of these individuals soon
appeared on US and EU sanctions lists will hardly help his prospects of a future without incarceration, to put it
mildly.
Of the non-imprisoned opposition, it is largely liberals such as PARNAS party leader Boris Nemtsov and Democratic
Choice movement leader Vladimir Milov who have articulated critiques of the Crimea intervention, describing it as
mendacious, costly and counter-productive. Their opposition (and that of the Pussy Riot collective) may merely
justify Putin’s narrative of liberal extremism, however.
Elsewhere, former opposition comrades have taken diametrically opposing positions. Left Front leader Sergei
Udaltsov argued that the Crimea referendum was a real example of people’s democracy, and called for excluding
opponents of this view from a united opposition (his supporters even picketed the Ukrainian embassy). As an
avowed Soviet restorationist, such views are hardly surprising (his Facebook page marked the 16 March vote in
Crimea by portraying a massive USSR state symbol), but perhaps they also show attempts to ingratiate himself
during his own ongoing trial on insurrection charges. Either that, or his support for Putin merely marks him as
complicit in his own exploitation.
Simultaneously, Other Russia leader Eduard Limonov, who previously could be relied on to lambast his fellow
oppositionists as insufficiently anti-Putin, has organised demonstrations in favour of the Crimea annexation. This
formerly beyond-the-pale extremist, whose parties have never been allowed to register, was even afforded a page in
the pro-government Izvestiya, where he denounced Yulia Tymoshenko as a ‘rat’ and argued that the Crimea vote
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showed the wish of all its population (Ukrainians and Tatars included) to escape the embrace of the Sashko Billys (a
Right Sector leader Oleksandr Muzychko, who was shot by police on 24 March).
Limonov’s intervention shows that many nationalist elements of the opposition (with Navalny the principal
exception), are happy to set aside previous antagonisms towards Putin to defend Russian speakers against the
‘fascist threat’. With Putin’s evident shift towards traditionalist nationalist positions since his 2012 re-election
increasingly consolidated, he has repaired his shaky electoral coalition by thoroughly side-lining those liberals and
pragmatists who were once ex-President Dmitri Medvedev’s potential support base, and forging a neo-conservative
consensus.
How long will the Crimea effect continue to divide and disorientate? ‘Rally round the flag’ effects are transient, and
the opposition might draw succour from the fact that Putin’s previous record support after the 2008 Georgia conflict
did not prevent mass protests three years later. Opinion polls show that Putin’s support is relatively soft (some 30-50
per cent of the electorate might support another candidate in 2018, although not the current alternatives).
On the other hand, a constant stoking of nationalist resentment against outside enemies, in conditions of restricted
media, gives limited prospects that the opposition can even raise awareness of any domestic issues that might
enable a concerted assault on Putin’s record. A key question at the time of writing is whether this nationalistic
hysteria might lead a Kremlin, dizzy with success, to contemplate further foreign misadventures, in which case
opposition will be muzzled still further.
In The Hunger Games, President Snow’s demise only begins when his Head Gamemaker defects, joins forces with
the players and activates a previously-silent network of intra-elite dissidents. Previous ‘revolutions’ in the post-
Soviet space, not least the fall of Yanukovych, have relied on elite splits catalysing political opposition. Putin grasps
this and his post-election strategy is predicated on stigmatising any potential dissent. It’s still far too early to guess
whether the tactical masterstroke of the Crimea annexation results in the strategic gains Putin envisages, or the
enforced public conformity will blind him to dangers from within.
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